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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Respondent's estoppel theories were never presented to the 
lower court, and no ruling was made regarding them. The Utah 
Supreme Court is precluded by its own rulings from considering 
Respondent's estoppel theories for the first time on appeal. 
In addition, the record on appeal does not factually support 
Respondent's estoppel legal theories. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENTS OF ESTOPPEL AND QUASI ESTOPPEL WERE 
NEVER PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT AND NO RULING HAS EVER BEEN 
MADE ON THEM. 
Respondent argues for the first time on appeal that the 
doctrines of Estoppel in Pais and Quasi Estoppel preclude 
appellant's claim. Respondent incorrectly states that the 
District Court concluded under "principles of Estoppel" that the 
20,000 shares of In-Tec's stock were not subject to the 20-1 
reverse split. Respondent does not cite to the record any 
Conclusion of Law supporting her claim. There is none. 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that matters 
raised for the first time on appeal are not subject to review by 
this Court. Travner v. Cushinq, 688 P.2d 856 (UT 1984). As 
stated by this Court in Trayner: 
Defendant raises this point for the first 
time on appeal. . . Issues not presented to 
the trial court for decision are not 
reviewable by this Court, and we express no 
opinion on the issue. 
1 
Id. at 857. Likewise, this Court should not consider these 
issues for the first time on appeal. 
Inasmuch as Respondent does not dispute the law cited by 
appellant that Utah Code Ann. 1953, §16-10-59 requires filing to 
make an Amendment effective (Respondent's brief, p. 4); and, 
inasmuch as respondent cites no law in contradiction to 
appellant's brief that In-Tec had no authority to issue post 
split shares prior to December 21, 1984, this Court should find 
that Respondent's shares are currently 1,000. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT'S RECORD DOES NOT FACTUALLY SUPPORT A CLAIM 
OF ESTOPPEL. 
A. Elements of Estoppel Are Not Present. 
Respondent's claim to estoppel is not supported by the 
record. The Utah Supreme Court has consistently adhered to proof 
of specific elements in order to support a claim for estoppel. 
Kelly v. Richards. 83 P.2d 731 (UT 1938); Coleman v. Coleman, 67 
Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (UT 1987). These elements are as follows: 
In order to constitute this kind of estoppel 
there must exist a false representation or 
concealment of material facts; it must have 
been made with knowledge, actual or 
constructive, of the facts; the party to whom 
it was made must have been without knowledge 
or the means of knowledge of the real facts; 
it must have been made with the intention 
that it should be acted upon; and the party 
to whom it was made must have relied on or 
acted upon it to his prejudice. 
Kelly, 83 P.2d at 734. "If any of these elements are missing, 
2 
there can be no estoppel.11 Coleman, 67 Utah Adv. Rep. at 12. 
"They are each of equal importance." Kelly, 83 P.2d at 734. 
Respondent's claim of estoppel is factually flawed. At the 
time the stock was issued to Respondent, she had been the 
accountant for In-Tec for two years. She prepared the financial 
statements for In-Tec and the capital stock account entries for 
both 1983 and 1984 were identical. There were no increases or 
decreases. (TR 44-49; 60 - Ex. 14-15) The respondent had 
complete access to the company recordte and the entry under 
capital stock always reflected the value of the issued and 
outstanding shares. (TR 44-49; 60 - Ex. 14-15) Respondent knew 
the shares she held were not reflected on the corporate books as 
post-split shares. She cannot now claim estoppel when she had 
knowledge of the true facts. 
B. A Party Claiming Estoppel Cannot Rely on Acts Contrary to Her 
Own Knowledge. 
As stated, respondent had knowledge of the failure of the 
corporation to file the Certificate of Amendment with the Utah 
Department of Business Regulation. Respondent knew the amount of 
capital shares as reflected in the financial statements. (TR 44-
49; 60 - Ex. 14-15) Respondent cannot not claim innocence and 
require the Court to ignore her knowledge. Estoppel is not 
available to her. 
This case is similar to the Utah Supreme Court case of 
Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695 (UT 1976) . In 
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Morgan, lessees brought an action to have the Court determine 
their ten-year lease had been extended for an additional ten 
years• The Land Board had sent a letter to lessees instructing 
them on how to convert their leases to a twenty year lease. 
Lessees did not follow the instructions. The year their lease 
was to expire the Board erroneously sent a letter to them stating 
that rent was to be paid for the next year by December 31, 1973. 
The lessees paid by check the amount due for 1974. The Land 
Board discovered their mistake in March, 1974 and returned the 
check. 
The Court first found the Land Board could not have entered 
into a contract with lessees for the 1974 year in that all 
contracts and leases had to be approved by the Attorney General 
as required by statute. Id. at 697. The Court secondly found no 
estoppel in that plaintiffs failed to exercised prudence or 
diligence in their extension of their leases although they had 
knowledge of the manner in which to extend them. id. The Court 
stated: 
Estoppel arises when a party (defendant Board) 
by his acts, representations, or admissions, or 
by his silence when he ought to speak, intentionally 
or through culpable negligence, induces another 
(plaintiffs) to believe certain facts to exist 
and that such other (plaintiffs) acting with 
reasonable prudence and diligence, relies and 
acts thereon so that he will suffer an injustice 
if the former (Land Board) is permitted to deny 
the existence of such facts. 
Id. 
Respondent also knew the true corporate affairs and cannot 
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now claim estoppel. 
As stated by the Court in Morgan, the test for knowledge is 
a reasonable person standard. While there is no specific finding 
by the lower court that Respondent knew the Amendment had not 
been filed, a reasonable person preparing the financial 
statements with complete access to the corporate records which 
did not reflect a change in the capital stock before or after 
receipt of her stock would know the stock issued to her was 
likewise subject to the same reverse split as all outstanding 
shares as of the date the Amendment became effective. Accord, 
Larson v. Wvcoff Co., 624 P.2d 1151 (UT 1981) where the Utah 
Supreme Court held: 
Furthermore, a determination of the issue of 
estoppel is not dependent on the subjective state 
of mind of the person claiming he was misled, 
but rather is to be based on an objective test, 
i.e., what would a reasonable person conclude 
under the circumstances. 
Id. at 1155. 
A reasonable person would conclude the stock reverse split 
had not become effective. Respondent has no basis for an 
estoppel claim. 
C. Utah Has Never Adopted a Separate Estoppel Doctrine Entitled 
Quasi Estoppel. 
Utah has never recognized a separate quasi estoppel 
doctrine. As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in Kelly, all 
elements of estoppel must be present or else there simply is no 
estoppel. 83 P.2d at 734. Further, in some of the cases cited 
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by respondent for this doctrine, the courts require a finding of 
"willfulness" before the quasi estoppel doctrine is applied. 
Green v. State. 193 So. 312 (A 1940) "misconduct or willful 
failure"; Application of Unqer. 220 N.Y.S.2d 93 (N.Y. 1961) "own 
willful act"; Westinahouse Electric Corp. v. Pacific Gas & 
Electric Co. , 326 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1964) "wrongful active 
concealment . . . positive action"; The lower court made no 
finding of willfulness or fraud in failure to file the Amendment. 
Further, in order to assert the doctrine, the person 
advancing the doctrine must not have been careless. El Paso 
National Bank v. Southwest. 548 S.W.2d 942 (Tx.Ct.App. 1977). As 
stated by the court in El Paso; 
'In no event can an estoppel arise in favor 
of one who has been guilty of contributory 
negligence.' The basis for such rule, of course, 
is that an estoppel resting wholly on equity 
cannot be used to shift a loss from one careless 
person to another. 
Id. at 948, quoting from 31 C.J.S. Estoppel §102 (1964). 
Respondent cannot claim the doctrine of quasi estoppel, even 
if recognized by the Utah Supreme Court, in that she does not 
come to Court as a completely innocent party. She had knowledge 
of the true corporate affairs and did nothing to protect her own 
interests. She, likewise, was careless. 
The Utah Supreme Court cases cited by respondent do not 
announce the quasi estoppel doctrine. They are likewise not 
controlling. Rogers v. Hanson. 580 P.2d 233 (UT 1978) 
specifically mentions "fraud". Grover v. Garn, 464 P.2d 598 
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(Utah 1970) implies a piercing of the corporate veil under the 
facts in that case may have been different if the court was 
dealing with a corporation having a multitude of stockholders 
situated over the country as in this case. The other cases also 
specifically state the elements for estoppel as found in the 
Kelly case. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent attempts to rely on a matter not raised at trial 
not ruled upon by the lower court. This Court should not 
consider it for the first time on appeal. Further, under Utah 
law plaintiff cannot assert the doctrine of estoppel in paid in 
that respondent had full knowledge of the facts. The doctrine of 
quasi estoppel has never been adopted by the Utah courts. Even 
if applicable, respondent was also careless and cannot claim 
equity where her own conduct is not innocent. Inasmuch as 
respondent does not dispute the law cited in appellant's brief, 
appellant requests the Court to hold that respondent currently 
has issued and outstanding 1,000 shares. 
DATED this ^ day of November, 1987. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
Elwood P. Powell 
Attorneys for In-Tec 
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